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The Smile of Accomplishment: 
Sylvia Plath's Ambition Patricia Hampl 
i 
NOVEMBER, 1966, and before me is a book titled Ariel which I am 
reviewing for the University of Minnesota student newspaper. It is the first 
book review I've ever written. I push on, past my timidity, with a lead I 
hope is punchy: "Women poets, as a rule, have a hard time of it." 
I am the only girl on the student literary magazine. I am not really aware 
that I'm the only girl on the staff; I don't see things that way yet. It would 
never occur to me to say I am the only woman on staff. I want to be a writer, 
and I bring more urgency to this desire than to anything I actually want to 
write about. 
That, roughly, was the situation when I asked to review Ariel in the fall 
of 1966.1 had to do some fast talking to get the literary editor's permission. 
"Who's Sylvia Plath?" he said. "I can't see giving her any inches." Copy 
was measured in column inches. 
"She committed suicide," I said, in an attempt to boost her reputation. 
He was convinced finally when he saw that a famous poet, Robert Lowell, 
had written an introduction to the book in which he called the poems a 
"triumph." 
I hold now the elderly, fragile newsprint of the review. What in the 
world was I really thinking when I wrote this oddly chipper prose? I note 
approvingly that Plath "is no crusader." I compliment her for being "well 
past movements, improvements, or a better deal for the little woman 
intellectual." Rather, I say, Sylvia Plath "is trying to survive." I don't 
explain what I mean by surviving. I speak airily of Plath's "brand of 
femininity" which I say is composed of "concerns more basic to woman 
than the traditional feminine hang-ups of babies and repressed sexuality." I 
don't explain what is more basic than sexuality and babies. Nor do I seem 
to think it strange to refer to babies as a hang-up. 
I don't remember writing the review. But I do remember reading it in the 
student union as soon as the paper came out Friday morning. The boldface 
Bodoni headline cut deeply into the unmarked surface of my ambition: 
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PLATH WRITES NASTY, BITTER, COMPELLING POETRY 
And there below, a little smaller but just as boldly inky, was my byline. 
Then the inches and inches of words. My words. That's what I remember. 
That's what it was all about: I had managed to get published. 
It is hard to think of a poet, certainly any woman poet, who has 
documented an ambition as ferocious as Sylvia Plath's. Her relationship 
with The New Yorker, faithfully logged in her journal, was positively 
operatic: 
. . . My baby uThe Matisse Chapel,}) which I have been spending the 
imaginary money from and discussing with modest egoism, was rejected 
by The New Yorker this morning with not so much as a pencil scratch 
on the black-and-white doom of the printed rejection. I hid it under a pile 
of papers like a stillborn illegitimate baby. . . . 
She entered contests, sent off poems and stories dutifully in her SASE's. She 
raged and wept and castigated herself over rejections, then rose again to 
stuff fresh envelopes for other magazines, other contests. 
As everyone knows, she sometimes prevailed. Before she left Smith, she 
was a literary figure on campus; she had published a prize-winning story in 
Mademoiselle, seven poems in Seventeen, and had won prizes for her poetry. 
She even received letters from admiring fans: 
Hundreds of dreaming ambitious girls would like to be in my place. They 
write me letters, asking if they may correspond with me. 
She seems bewildered that this success, along with "a few lovely clothes, 
and one intelligent, handsome boy," has not satisfied her. 
In the very next paragraph of her journal, she turns to the ominous 
question: 
Why did Virginia Woolf commit suicide? Or Sara Teasdale or the other 
brilliant women? Neurotic? Was their writing sublimation (oh, horrible 
word) of deep, basic desires? If only I knew. If only I knew how high 
I could set my goals, my requirements for my life! 
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The assumption behind the question seems to be that, for a woman, the 
inner urge to accomplishment is not one of the "deep, basic desires" of life. 
Ambition is the shameful desire of an aberrant?because selfish?female 
life. 
There is a breathless, fevered quality to Plath's ambition, as if the 
stillborn illegitimate baby she must hide is not a poem rejected by The New 
Yorker but the private impluse that gave rise to the writing of the poem in 
the first place. Even her stunning discipline troubles her; it is not a good 
habit, but an addiction. "Why am I obsessed," she writes in her 1951 
journal, the summer before her sophomore year, "with the idea I can justify 
myself by getting manuscripts published?" 
Plath suffered from crushing attacks of jealousy as well. Ambition at least 
was 
something she could give the name of discipline and harness for work. 
Jealousy, on the other hand, was a blight; it spread everywhere, seeping out 
of the bounds of literary or academic competition into the very fabric of her 
self: 
I am jealous of those who think more deeply, who write better, who draw 
better, who ski better, who look better, who love better, who live better 
than I. . . . 
This pattern doesn't shift until she marries Ted Hughes. Then, for all the 
joy she expresses in finding a partner, the heavy plot only thickens: she 
becomes ambitious for two. 
In the early girlhood journal entries she is crazed by her ambition, 
plagued by jealousy and scorekeeping. She is aware that her seriousness cuts 
her off from something else she craves: social life leading to intimacy. The 
experience of being a college grind is so painful she writes of it in her journal 
in the literary second person: 
There comes a time when you walk downstairs to pick up a letter you 
forgot, and the low confidential voices of the little group of girls in the 
living room suddenly ravels into an incoherent mumble and their eyes 
slide slimily through you, around you, away from you in a snaky effort 
not to meet the tentative half-fear quivering in your own eyes. . . . You 
know it was meant for you, so do they who stab you. . . . So you hear 
her say to you, uwe}d rather flunk school and be sociable than stick in our 
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rooms all the time, 
" 
and very sweetly, "I never see you. You're always 
studying in your room! 
" 
And you keep your mouth shut. And oh, how 
you smile! 
After her marriage, this changes. "And here I am," she exults in the journal, 
"Mrs. Hughes. And wife of a published poet." The humiliating loneliness 
of the scholarship girl has been companioned: she is Mrs. Hughes. And the 
ferocious ambition has been assuaged by projection: she is married to a 
published poet. 
Plath's ambition, which had been a shameful passion precisely because it 
was 
"selfish," seemed more acceptable to her now. The attacks of jealously 
are bleached away in the light of marriage, replaced by the happy fretfulness 
of a devoted wife: 
. . . woke . . . depressed over Ted's 3 rejections of poems from The 
Nation (after 3 acceptances in a row, a stupid letter from M. L. 
Rosenthal, rejecting them for the wrong reasons). . . . Ted is an 
excellent poet: full of blood & discipline, like Yeats. Only why won't 
these editors see it??? 
When Ted Hughes's first book, The Hawk in the Rain, is accepted for 
publication in 1957, Plath's delight is touchingly absolute: 
I am so glad Ted is first. All my pat theories against marrying a writer 
dissolve with Ted: his rejections more than double my sorrow & his 
acceptances rejoice me more than mine. 
It is heartbreaking to read such guilelessness from a person who in her 
earlier journal is a barracuda about her career, a woman whose ambition 
seemed her bosom companion. But for once we, her posthumous readers, 
are more ironic than she: ah yes, his rejections more than double your 
sorrow. The post-feminist eyebrow arches. 
Through it all?college, marriage, babies, end of marriage?Plath kept 
writing. She remained steely about her discipline and steadfast about the 
value of publishing. "Being born a woman," she writes in her early college 
journal, "is my awful tragedy." That is, a tragedy to her ambition. 
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When I was reviewing Ariel in 1966, Sylvia Plath's suicide struck me as 
inexplicable. A few years later, with the extraordinary articulation of early 
feminist criticism, that suicide was so highly explicated it had become an 
archetype. It almost ceased to be the real death of an actual person; Plath's 
suicide "stood" for an unbearable inequity suffered by generations of 
women artists. Thus began her brief career as a feminist saint, as victim/ 
martyr. 
By 1970 it was already possible to read a great deal about Sylvia Plath. But 
her suicide did not speak to me; it remained a melodramatic finish to the real 
story. For the real story, to me, was the exemplary tale of her ambition. She 
was a woman who had not been afraid or ashamed to try. 
She made ambition seem less wrong for a woman. I saw her ambition in 
wholly sociological terms and was cheered by it. I did not consider the 
psychological cost of her struggle. 
My own early heroine-hunting had been all about seeking the model of 
the serious girl writer who prevailed. I deleted Plath's suicide, and put in 
boldface her strenuous discipline and all those self-addressed manila enve 
lopes stuffed with poems sent to big magazines. Feminism latched on to 
Plath as a figure of the thwarted woman; I held on to her as an exemplary 
apprentice writer. 
But now it seems to me that just as her victim/martyr role has since been 
dismantled, thereby liberating her poetry, so too her consuming ambition 
no longer seems "feminist." Her journals, in particular, show that this 
seething ambition was not merely a model of careerism. 
Her fever pitch, in fact, was not fundamentally about literature. Plath's 
was a 
religious longing which never got the name it deserved: it was a 
spiritual, not a literary, quest. 
Plath wrote most of the Ariel poems in the fall of 1962, just after the 
breakup of her marriage. On October 16, 1962, exactly in the middle of the 
Ariel month (thirty poems in that single month), she wrote her mother, "I 
am a genius of a writer; I have it in me. I am writing the best poems of my 
life; they will make my name. ..." No one else had yet seen any of the 
poems. 
This statement to her mother is reminiscent of Keats's famous remark in 
a letter to his brother and sister-in-law in 1818: "I think I shall be among the 
English Poets after my death." Keats had his annus mirabilis (1818-19), as 
Plath had her miraculous autumn of 1962. Though Plath's genius is 
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notoriously self-absorbed and Keats's is unusually unself-conscious, they 
belong in some ways to the same tribe. 
The summer of 1951, when she had a baby-sitting job for a family in 
Swampscott, Massachusetts (she was 19), Plath wrote this luminous 
passage in her journal after a hike by the ocean: 
A serene sense of the slow inevitability of the gradual changes in the 
earth's crust comes over me. A consuming love, not of a god, but of the 
clean unbroken sense that the rocks which are nameless, the waves which 
are nameless, the ragged grass which is nameless, are all defined 
momentarily through the consciousness of the being who observes them. 
With the sun burning into rock, and flesh, and the wind ruffling grass and 
hair, there is an awareness that the blind immense unconscious imper 
sonal and neutral forces will endure, and that the fragile, miraculously 
knit organism which interprets them, endows them with meaning, will 
move about for a little, then falter, fail, and decompose at last into the 
anonymous soil, voiceless, faceless, without identity. 
Though the word is not used in this passage, the subject clearly is the 
poet's mission. This powerfully serene voice is not the one usually 
associated with Sylvia Plath. It is very Keatsian in its radiance. His letter to 
his brother and sister-in-law in Kentucky comes to mind: 
The mighty abstract Idea I have of Beauty in all things stifles the more 
divided and minute domestic happiness ... but I must have a thousand 
of those beautiful particles to fill up my heart. I feel more and more every 
day, as my imagination strengthens, that I do not live in this world alone 
but in a thousand worlds?No sooner am I alone than shapes of epic 
greatness are stationed around me. 
. . . 
The reverence, both in the passage from Plath's journal and in Keats's letter, 
emanates from a direct sensation of poetry experienced in nature. For Keats, 
the relation was as intense and fundamental as family: "The roaring of the 
wind is my wife and the Stars through the window pane are my Children," 
he says elsewhere. 
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The reverence for other writers and their accomplishments is, for Plath as 
it was also for Keats, sometimes a thrilling goad, sometimes an invitation to 
masochistic self-criticism. As Plath says in an early journal entry: 
I am closest to Amy Lowell, in actuality, I think. I love the lyric clarity 
and purity of Elinor Wylie, the whimsical, lyrical, typographically 
eccentric verse of E.E. Cummings, and yearn toward T.S. Eliot, 
Archibald MacLeish, Conrad Aiken. . . . And when I read, God, 
when I read the taut, spare, lucid prose of Louis Untermeyer, and the 
distilled intensities of poet after poet, I feel stifled, weak, pallid, 
mealy-mouthed and utterly absurd. 
In his biography of Keats, W. Jackson Bate addresses the issue of fame 
and the young genius-poet's positive need for models of greatness. He 
refers to Whitehead's remark that "moral education is impossible apart 
from the habitual vision of greatness." This is so, Bate says, because "the 
ideal of greatness, as the Greeks discovered, is ultimately self-corrective in 
its effect as well as self-impelling." 
The ideal of greatness?not the evidence or even the example of 
greatness. But of course the ideal imposes the search for the actual. It 
sometimes caused Sylvia Plath to light her taper before rather unlikely icons 
("the taut, spare lucid prose of Louis Untermeyer"?), just as the very young 
Keats felt an initial reverence for Leigh Hunt's poetry which he later 
recognized was inflated. 
Plath's ambition was a thirst for greatness, and also a private, curiously 
humble recognition of her call to be "the fragile, miraculously knit 
organism which interprets" that she understood to be the poet's true 
identity. "Yes, God," she says in the same Swampscott journal entry, "I 
want to talk to everybody I can as deeply as I can. I want to be able to sleep 
in an open field, to travel west, to walk freely at night." 
For a woman, a girl of 19, to wish to "walk freely at night" is a poignant 
wish, of course. Hardly less poignant than her perfect definition of the 
poet?a person who wishes to talk to everybody as deeply as possible. Her 
vision here is as incandescent and winning as Emily Dickinson's desire to 
write a "letter to the world that never wrote to me. 
" 
In a later journal entry, 
Plath echoes Dickinson directly, wondering whether she has "the ability or 
genius to write a big letter to the world. ..." 
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It is clear that at an early age Sylvia Plath understood her writing to be a 
vocation and therefore inevitably a spiritual quest?although neither her 
background nor the culture of her youth provided her with the language or 
models of such spirituality. She saw writing as "a trust, a creative pledge to 
affirm life, hell and heaven, mud and marble." She was 20 years old when 
she wrote this pledge in her journal. 
Greatness, perceived in others, can be held in mind as a radiant image. The 
icons come easily to mind: Mozart, Shakespeare, Picasso. But the ideal of 
greatness exists differently. Its dynamism must be an act of faith. It is not 
a 
recognition, as a perception of greatness in others is. The ideal is an 
imaginative act. 
And this ideal inaugurates a struggle. As Plath says in a journal entry 
written in England about a month before she met Ted Hughes, "One 
cannot help but wish for those situations that make us heroic, living to the 
hilt of our total resources. Our cosmic fights, when I think the end of the 
world is come, are so many broken shells around our growth." 
Although Plath considers briefly in her journal a "splurge of altruism" in 
which she might sacrifice herself "on the altar of the Cause with a capital 
C," there is no mention of what this Cause might be. She never identified 
deeply with any political cause for long. 
She was casting her lot in the 1950s, and it seems clear, at least in the 
journals, that the struggle she knew she must engage in was interior. Not 
simply a struggle with her past?the impulse is not transparently autobio 
graphical. Rather, the interiority is spiritual, an impulse toward transfor 
mation rather than confession. "I have long wanted to read and explore the 
theories of philosophy, psychology, national, religious and primitive 
consciousness," she says in the journal, linking her search to disciplines 
related to spiritual life. 
In her Chapters in a Mythology, Judith Kroll sees in Plath's poetry "one 
overriding concern: the problem of rebirth or transcendence." The late 
poems in particular and Plath's definition of poetic vocation exhibit a calling 
which gave her "access to depths formerly reserved to primitive ecstatic 
priests, shamans and Holy men," as Kroll quotes Ted Hughes on the 
subject of Plath's sense of mission. 
Plath herself seemed baffled by her fascination with "poetic identities of 
characters who commit suicide, adultery, or get murdered. ..." She can 
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only explain her attraction to these subjects by admitting in her journal that, 
for her, "What they say is True." This truth, though she does not embody 
it herself until the Ariel poems, is the truth of conflict, struggle?that which 
effects fundamental change. In these dramatic conflicts, Plath instinctively 
senses the theater of death and rebirth. The struggle is not simply a 
spectacle. It has a spiritual purpose, recognized as such: 
I want to get back to my more normal intermediate path where the 
substance of the world is permeated by my being: eating food, reading, 
writing, talking, shopping: so all is good in itself'and not just a hectic 
activity to cover up the fear that must face itself and duel itself to death, 
saying: A Life is Passing! 
The real horror here (in strictly religious language, the real sin) is not 
death but the featureless 
"passing" of a life. Death is the greatest struggle, 
like those that leave "so many broken shells around our growth." It is not 
an end, but the deepest metaphor possible, literal and yet also a model for 
any re-creation of the self, any search for the real self beneath the litter of 
false selves of "hectic activity." 
After her breakdown in 1953, Plath underwent a course of electric shock 
treatments which she always maintained had been administered incorrectly 
and almost electrocuted her. (One political event she notes in her work with 
eloquent feeling and particular horror is the death of the Rosenbergs.) She 
saw the experience as her own brutal high-tech death and resurrection. As 
she says in her journal of 1956, she wanted to write 
a detailed description of shock treatment, tight, blasting short descriptions 
with not one smudge of coy sentimentality. . . . There will be no hurry, 
because I am too desperately vengeful now. But I will pile them up. . . . 
the inevitable going down the subterranean hall, waking to a new world, 
with no name, being born again, and not of woman. 
This is the selfless "will to bear witness" of the survivor, a phenomenon 
Terrence Des Pr?s describes in The Survivor. It is an urgency shared by 
those who emerged from the death camps and felt compelled to speak "for 
the others." It is not a self-involved morbidity, nor a fascination with pain 
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for its own sake. The experience of such extremity is not the "witnessing." 
Only the writing of it, only the telling, can approach transcendence. 
The relation of a poet of mythic sensibility to autobiographical material 
is bound to be paradoxical. The unformed autobiographical material is like 
a bright shred of plastic which the poet breathes into, creating a balloon. 
The self is inflated and floats aloft for all to see. Most American poets write 
such poems of lyric autobiography. 
A poet of mythic sensibility, however, seems compelled to reach up and 
puncture this rounded autobiographical shape, to end the severe limitation 
of meaning imposed by the merely personal use of autobiography. Plath, in 
the Ariel poems, is such a mythic poet, grasping at the inflated balloon of 
her life, causing it to collapse. This collapse of autobiography is a longing 
for a more powerfully resonant voice, the voice of mythic significance. 
Myth, after all, is that voice Plath identified in her journal, the voice which 
allows the poet "to talk to everybody ... as deeply as possible." 
The victims of extreme suffering that Terrence Des Pr?s writes of inherit 
a passionate "will to bear witness" and are not, he argues, suffering from 
"survivor guilt" but from an urgent need to perform the task given them by 
history: to testify. They need to be useful. 
Similiarly, poets who undergo this collapse of the autobiographical self in 
the service of an emerging mythic self speak in a rinsed, shining voice which 
moves from personal loss to spiritual gain. Adrienne Rich, when her work 
began to reflect the experience of her feminist transformation, began to 
speak of the longing to be useful, to use rather than explore or exhibit the 
self: 
. . . I am an instrument in the shape 
of a woman trying to translate pulsations 
into images for the relief of the body 
and the reconstruction of the mind. 
Judith Kroll notes a similar impulse in Plath's remark at the end of her life 
when she was writing the Ariel poems: 
I feel like a very effficient tool or weapon, 
used and in demand from moment to moment. 
10 
It is chilling, even repellent, to see the human recede into usefulness. It is 
deathly. But then, nothing less than death can cause the self to burn away, 
to cease to be the stuff of autobiography, lost in a new task, no longer 
personal, but a mythic tool?or as Plath feared?a weapon. 
Why would anyone want to die? Even in a poem, why die? The pain of 
spiritual death keeps most poets?most people?safely within autobiogra 
phy, repeating the lyric sensation of buoyancy that, after all, is what is 
usually meant by "being alive." 
But once the autobiographical balloon bursts (usually through some 
form of unwilling loss), all the rules change. The laws of autobiography 
form the humanistic code of logic, of the beauty and supremacy of the body 
and the senses, and of lyric sensibility. In autobiography, I matter. In the 
post-autobiographical world, I am matter. 
In this spiritual realm, where the narrative line of one's life burned away, 
survival is based, as it is in art, on paradox: you must lose your soul to find 
it; die that you may live; surrender that you may be free. The world of 
spiritual life, therefore, is not unduly impressed by death. Or rather, it has 
found a central usefulness for death: death is that which effects resurrection. 
Still, pain is a fact, and the autobiographical self is firm about pain: it is 
bad ... or at least, it is too bad. The autobiographical self, after all, is no 
fool: it knows who must do the dying. 
II 
I can think of no contemporary poet who shares Plath's struggle as fully as 
the philosopher Simone Weil does. But to call Weil a "philosopher" in this 
century suggests a secular identity that misses her subject and her impor 
tance. She was, of course, a religious writer. She has much to say about 
suffering, that inevitable bridge from self to spirit. Weil's life is a fitting 
companion to Plath's attempt in her final poems to die and be born again, 
to locate her true, useful self under the false selves of ambition and personal 
loss, humiliation and impotence. 
Simone Weil was, in her own fashion, a suicide. The starvation saint. She 
died in England in 1943, refusing nourishment and medical treatment for 
tuberculosis in an act of solidarity with those in the French Resistance. An 
unnecessary death, as far as the autobiographical self is concerned, a willful 
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death, like any suicide. But for the moment, I read her?death and 
life?from the world where I think she finally lived, the post 
autobiographical position of spiritual transformation, not from her "life," 
which was not her goal. It is the world also of Plath's great work, the Ariel 
poems. 
More to the literary point, Plath and Weil share a voice?the scorched 
voice of the spiritual pilgrim. This is Weil: "Love is a sign of our 
wretchedness. God can only love himself. We can only love something 
else." And here is Plath: 
I am too pure for you or anyone. 
Your body 
Hurts me as the world hurts God. 
"We possess nothing in this world," Weil says, "other than the power to 
say I. This is what we should yield up to God, and that is what we should 
destroy." A statement made from the precarious bridge between autobiog 
raphy and spirituality. To "carry one's cross," Weil explains, is precisely to 
cut down the tree of self, fashion it into the cross, "and then, carry it every 
day." 
Weil calls this process "decreation." It is the way the self ceases to 
matter?and becomes matter. It is the experience Plath imagined during her 
au pair summer by the ocean in Swampscott: ". 
. . an awareness that . . . 
the fragile, miraculously knit organism which interprets . . . will move 
about for a little, then falter, fail, and decompose at last into the anonymous 
soil, voiceless, faceless, without identity." 
Death is central to the usefulness the spirit seeks as its true identity. "We 
have to die in order to liberate a tied-up energy," Weil says, "in order to 
possess an energy which is free and capable of understanding the relation 
ship of things." That may be the best definition of usefulness: an energy 
capable of understanding the relationship of things. 
Once this truth is established, Simone Weil turns to pain, that constituent 
of death. In a central essay, "The Love of God and Affliction," she explores 
the essential role affliction plays in the "decreation" of self. 
She is careful to distinguish affliction from "simple suffering." To her 
mind, "the great enigma of human life is not suffering but affliction." She 
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makes several attempts in the essay to characterize what she means by the 
word: 
Affliction is an uprooting of life, a more or less attenuated equivalent of 
death, made irresistably present to the soul by the attack or immediate 
apprehension of physical pain. 
Affliction is essentially a destruction of personality, a lapse into 
anonymity. 
In the end, she presents a three-part definition of this form of suffering 
"which leaves the victim writhing on the ground like a half-crushed 
worm": 
There is not real affliction unless the event which has gripped and 
uprooted a life attacks it directly or indirectly in all its parts, social, 
psychological, and physical. The social factor is essential. There is not 
really affliction where there is not social degradation or the fear of it in 
some form or other. 
Weil comes back several times in the essay to this triad which forms 
affliction. "Extreme affliction," she writes, "means physical pain, distress 
of soul and social degradation, all together. ..." She adds that "it is the 
essence of affliction that it is suffered unwillingly." The dizzying sensation 
of senselessness, o?uselessness, must accompany its first stages. The "Why?" 
or 
"Why me?" of all grievous laments. "There can be no answer to the 
'Why?' of the afflicted," Weil says, "because the world is necessity and not 
purpose." 
She pursues the point further. "People often reproach Christianity," she 
says, 
for a morbid preoccupation with suffering and grief. This is an error. 
Christianity is not concerned with suffering and grief, for they are 
sensations, psychological states, in which a perverse indulgence is always 
possible; its concern is with something quite different, which is affliction. 
Affliction is not a psychological state; it is a pulverization of the soul by 
the mechanical brutality of circumstances. 
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Weil goes on immediately to locate human purpose in the light of affliction: 
"It is our function in this world to consent to the existence of the universe." 
The autobiographical self dies hard?as it must to be true to itself. The 
cruellest aspect of affliction, as Weil describes it, is the guilty sensation of 
complicity it inspires in its victim. "Like a red-hot iron," affliction 
stamps the soul to its very depths with the contempt, the disgust, and even 
the self-hatred and sense of guilt and defilement which crime logically 
should produce but actually does not. Evil dwells in the heart of the 
criminal without being felt there. It is felt in the heart of the man who is 
afflicted and innocent. 
This paradox may occur because affliction, with its trinity of suffering 
(physical, psychological and social) allows no escape. It corrals the self 
within itself. This interiority invites the feeling of complicity. One feels 
attachment, even the attachment of a creator, to the affliction. 
"Everything happens," Weil says, "as though the state of soul appropri 
ate for criminals had been separated from crime and attached to affliction; 
and it even seems to be in proportion to the innocence of those who are 
afflicted." This sounds like Kafka?and it sounds like the lament of the 
educated twentieth century person, the voice heard buzzing low from a 
therapist's office. 
We accept as mythically apt Kafka's contortions, his elaborate guilt and 
infinitely patient descriptions of impotence and anguish. We see his devilish 
sensation of complicity in his own suffering as parts of his spiritual 
quest?and of ours. We understand his affliction, if we give over to him at 
all, as evidence of spiritual work of the highest sort. He is understood to be 
a 
religious writer. He said it himself: "Writing is prayer." 
Why, then, have Sylvia Plath's contortions not seemed generative in this 
way? Partly, of course, because of the suicide, an act whose willfulness 
breaks the bond with affliction. Then too, the early writing about Plath 
claimed her work and life absolutely in what I've called a "sociological" 
way. The meaning of Plath's work necessarily remained political for quite 
some time. 
There is another reason, though, for the unwillingness to read Plath for 
what she most certainly was trying to become: born again. The reason 
returns us to the original feminist reading of her work, the "sociological" 
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reading. Our culture is not prepared to see its central myth played out by a 
female protagonist. Women have never been denied the right to suffer. But 
death-and-resurrection is a male role. As feminist theologians have been 
pointing out for two decades, in this world, God is a guy. 
Affliction, following Simone Weil's three-part definition sounds like the 
right word for Sylvia Plath's final months. She had recently given birth to 
her second child, had been hospitalized for an emergency appendectomy 
(the flowers in "Tulips" come from this hospitalization), she was suffering 
from the worst winter London had experienced in decades?that covers 
physical pain. And certainly the psychological anguish of the breakup of her 
marriage (that tragically idealized marriage of two poets we read of in her 
journal) was accompanied by real or feared social humiliation. One need 
only read her poem "The Rival" to sense this. 
Social degradation is such an essential component of affliction because in 
a curious way it virtually ostracizes the victim while paradoxically casting 
her into a glaring public light. When the social degradation is caused by 
sexual humiliation, the pain is heightened. The victim feels terribly isolated, 
alone?and hideously exposed. "No day is safe from news of you," Plath 
says to her rival. 
Unfortunately, Ted Hughes destroyed Plath's journals from this 
period?what would have been the Ariel journals?and so the personal 
voice of her affliction is not available to us for this crucial period as it is for 
her earlier years as a college student and young wife and mother. 
Interestingly, martyrs (whose business it is to suffer) are not victims of 
affliction. "The martyrs who came into the arena singing as they faced the 
wild beasts," Simone Weil writes, "were not afflicted." Christ, however, 
like Job, "was afflicted. He did not die like a martyr. He died like a common 
criminal, in the same class as thieves, only a little more ridiculous. For 
affliction is ridiculous." Christ, in a sense, was a suicide: he could have 
saved himself. "Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father," he says 
in the Garden of Gethsemane, rebuking one of his followers who strikes the 
slave of the high priest and cuts off his ear, "and he will at once send me 
more than twelve legions of angels? But how then should the scriptures be 
fulfilled, that it must be so?" Once again, the law of mythic life, not 
autobiographical life, is invoked: obedience belongs to necessity, not to a 
willful search for purpose. And when he asks for the cup to be passed from 
him in the Garden and yet yields to "thy will," Jesus also accomplishes what 
15 
Weil describes as "our function," our usefulness, on earth: to consent to the 
existence of all that is. 
It is easy to confuse religion with piety?and in doing so, to miss a 
powerful spiritual current that displays no recognizable "holy" language. 
There is no piety in the real self, in the soul. Once the post-autobiographical 
voice is speaking, things have gone well beyond pietisms. There is only the 
urgency of utterance whose function, like the true human one, is "neces 
sity." Plath did not define her search as religious, as Simone Weil did. Plath 
put her faith not in religion, but in language, in the struggle to say it. But 
it is curious how often she mentions God and how persistently she uses 
religious imagery. Plath speaks with this voice in "Lady Lazarus": 
Herr God, Herr Lucifer 
Beware 
Beware 
The inflation here feels very different from a lyric autobiographical inflation 
of the self and its experience. This heroic voice knows it is about to burst, 
to 
vaporize?to decreate itself. In "Tulips," Plath is quite explicit about the 
destruction of the autobiographical self: 
I have let things slip, a thirty-year-old cargo boat 
Stubbornly hanging on to my name and address. 
They have swabbed me clear of my loving associations. 
Scared and bare on the green plastic-pillowed trolley 
I watched my tea set, my bureaus of linen, my books 
Sink out of sight, and the water went over my head. 
I am a nun now, I have never been so pure. 
The purity here is not the radiance of the "triumphant" self Robert Lowell 
heralded in his introduction to Ariel; it is not a Lawrentian "Look-we-have 
come-through" feeling at all. It is death, all right, as the next stanza makes 
clear: 
I didn't want any flowers, I only wanted 
To lie with my hands turned up and be utterly empty. 
How free it is, you have no idea how free? 
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The peacefulness is so big it dazes you, 
And it asks nothing, a name tag, a few trinkets. 
It is what the dead close on, finally; I imagine them 
Shutting their mouths on it, like a Communion tablet. 
The Communion tablet of death?or death as Communion. You don't just 
burn away: you close on the Communion tablet, you become part of a 
Mystical Body. The point here is not the Christian imagery itself, but that 
Plath turned to it as the language that was available to her to describe the 
transformation she sought and intuited. 
She was conscious of what she was trying to achieve. The Ariel we read 
is not the book she knew. The manuscript she put together began, as the 
published Ariel also does, with "Morning Song," a poem about the birth of 
her first child which begins with the word "Love." But the book as she 
organized it was to have ended with "Wintering" (now in the middle of the 
collection). The last word of this poem is "spring," and Plath wrote to her 
mother of her satisfaction in this clear framework for the book. 
After her death, however, Ted Hughes reordered the collection, making 
various changes. The second to last poem in the book now is "Edge," 
probably the last poem Plath wrote, a chillingly suicidal poem that begins 
with the famous lines 
The woman is perfect. 
Her dead 
Body wears the smile of accomplishment, 
The illusion of a Greek necessity 
Flows in the scrolls in her toga, 
Her bare 
Feet seem to be saying: 
We have come so far, it is over. 
The final poem in the book is "Words," also one of her last poems, whose 
final lines are 
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From the bottom of the pool, fixed stars 
Govern a life. 
A very different ordering. In a sense, the Hughes organization is more 
accurate?autobiographically. Plath's ordering of the collection attests to 
her vision. In fact, according to Judith Kroll's careful piecing together of the 
writing of the final poems, none of the very last, frightening poems was in 
Plath's Ariel manuscript. She apparently wrote these grim poems (including 
"Totem," "Paralytic," "Mystic," "Words," "Contusion," and "Edge") 
after she put together the collection, after she left Devon where she and her 
husband had lived, and went to make her way in London on her own with 
her two children. 
Plath's intention would be more evident if her Ariel had been published, 
and the other, later poems had been collected separately. But perhaps this 
might have seemed an even worse travesty of the truth of things, a denial 
of the fact of her suicide. 
Whichever ordering seems more apt or more respectful of Plath's life and 
intentions, the fact remains that a woman who had written poems of 
genius, who had "decreated" the autobiographical self for the emergence of 
the "useful" mythic self, went off anyway and killed herself. 
What went wrong? Is transformation a delusion? Or is literature just 
another lying cheat? 
Ill 
I wish to trust poetry. This desire comes from a long habit of assuming that 
though it is made of nothing but words, that cheap material, poetry 
represents not only our lived life but our unlived life, the veiled existence of 
the soul. Simply: I believe poetry to be capable of religious revelation as 
religion itself is not. 
Religion is typically too constrained by the systems and institutions that 
claim it; the progress of the soul is muffled as well by communal rites that 
draw the self into a group circle. The poet, however, travels solo, darting 
from sacred to profane and back and under and around ..." exactly as the 
pilgrim soul must in its fundamental vow to "consent to the existence of the 
universe." 
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Plath's suicide, like any suicide, can only be read as the deft play of a wild 
card. There is no explaining why a person chooses to end her life. Maybe the 
elusive power of chance, not our occasional sensations of joy, accounts for 
the tendency of non-suicides to find life engaging, in spite of everything. 
But even if I have no faith in the possibility of discovering "why" Plath 
committed suicide, those final poems may possess an indication of an 
imperfectly imagined transformation. In reading them again and again, I 
must acknowledge a lot of wishing on my part?the wish to trust poetry, 
the wish that spiritual transformation truly exists, and can cleanse and 
reclaim a life whose 
"story," whose autobiography, has become a terrible 
hash. 
Poetry's essence is not to show or to tell as we say of fiction, but to 
reveal. This means the poet is not really in control, great as that illusion may 
sometimes be, especially in highly formal poetry. The illusion is great in 
Sylvia Plath's poems. Her sense of form is meticulous, her imagination 
refined, severe, her vision at the extreme edge of the sayable. 
Her early poems are weak exactly because her formal rigor is so absolute. 
Very little breath in those early poems, some collected in her first book, The 
Collosus, written by a young woman thumbing dutifully through her 
thesaurus. But in the Ariel poems, both the larger group Judith Kroll calls 
"mythic" and the final suicidal poems Ted Hughes added to the original 
manuscript, Plath's intentions are well-served by her economy and control. 
She even says so explicity in "Stings": 
I am no drudge 
Though for years I have eaten dust 
And dried plates with my dense hair. 
And seen my strangeness evaporate, 
Blue dew from dangerous skin. . . . 
It is almost over 
I am in control. 
The most startling thing about these poems of affliction that burn the 
autobiographical self into the mythic figure is not that they are filled with 
death. The problem seems to be that something is not sufficiently dead: 
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By the roots of my hair some god got hold of me. 
I sizzled in his blue volts like a desert prophet. 
? 
"The Hanging Man" 
I see your voice 
Black and leafy, as in my childhood, 
A yew hedge of orders, 
Gothic and barbarous, pure German. 
Dead men cry from it. 
-"Little Fugue" 
I am only thirty. 
And like the cat I have nine times to die. 
? 
"Lady Lazarus" 
"Lady Lazarus," in fact, is about dying fruitlessly, again and again. The 
references are to Plath's father's death (in this poem, in service to her mythic 
ordering, she places his death when she was ten, though he really died 
when she was eight), then her own suicide attempt at twenty, and the final 
preoccupation with death at thirty. 
But none of this dying gets the job done, it seems. There is a terrible 
living-on of the self, not just in memory, but in the habit of the self to be 
wounded (afflicted) to no purpose. "I suffer," Plath says in her journal, "but 
I do not become Shakespeare." Or the purpose is the cruel amusement of 
the crowd (Weil's social degradation): 
The peanut-crunching crowd 
Shoves in to see 
Them unwrap me hand and foot? 
The big strip tease. 
? 
"Lady Lazarus" 
What she feels capable of is cheap disclosure, a strip tease; what she requires 
is the miracle, resurrection. 
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Plath was "done for," as she puts it in "Death & Co.," perhaps because 
she was unable to conceive of transformation as a gesture, as a movement 
of the self, achieved as a gift received rather than as an accomplishment 
performed. In "Daddy," the poem about her first death, she is patricidal by 
the second stanza, in part because the father is perceived as a piece of 
statuary: 
Daddy, I have had to kill you, 
You died before I had time? 
Marble-heavy, a bag full of God, 
Ghastly statue with one grey toe. 
The gruesome mechanism that passes for living in "The Applicant" is 
another evidence of this grimly static perception of the self: 
A living doll, everywhere you look. 
It can sew, it can cook, 
It can talk, talk, talk. 
The next stanza insists, positively sells, the self as if it were an object: 
It works, there is nothing wrong with it. 
You have a hole, it's a poultice. 
You have an eye, it's an image. 
These images of the old self are supposed to die, in order to effect 
transformation. It's their not dying that causes the problem. They don't die 
because Plath keeps retrieving them as pure, controlled images, heavily 
refined. She frames everything ?which stops it, true enough, but hardly 
kills it. In fact, she memorializes what should go dead into the sepulchre and 
disappear for good. 
It is worth remembering that the first evidence of Christ's resurrection in 
the Gospel is not the discovery of his body, but the absence of his body 
from the tomb: no icon. In Matthew, Mary Magdelene and the "other 
Mary" go to the sepulchre. An angel appears and says, "Do not be afraid; 
for I know you seek Jesus who was crucified. He is not here; for he is risen, 
as he said. Come, see the place where he lay." 
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The women, we are told in Mark and Luke, have come with spices for the 
body. But there is no body. The first evidence is not of the transfigured, 
risen body (that comes later), but of the absence of the bodily self. (In John 
there is mention of the linen burial clothes used to wrap the body; seeing 
these bandages, John, "the one whom Jesus loved . . . believed.") And 
Thomas the Doubter, who needs not only to see but to touch the body, 
goes down in history as someone who missed the whole point of the 
resurrection. 
It may well be that literature cannot do what Plath went to it for. Her 
"problem," or her question, was religious, yet she remained rigorously 
literary in her strategies and resources. 
She seems aware, sometimes desperately so, of the narrow imagistic 
prison she has written herself into. One of the last poems is aptly titled 
"Paralytic." In "Years," she cries out for action as only the impotent can: 
What I love is 
The piston in motion? 
My soul dies before it. 
Once again transformation has been imaged (as the piston, an object), not 
imagined as movement. There is a pathetic wistfulness here. "I simply 
cannot see where there is to get to," she says pitifully in that beautiful 
poem, "The Moon and the Yew Tree." 
This frustration over movement and destination is significant. After all, 
as Ted Hughes arranged Ariel (using one of the very last poems Plath 
wrote), the last words in the book are "fixed stars/Govern a life." Any sign 
of movement seems threatening: 
How far is it? 
How far is it now? The gigantic gorilla interior 
Of the wheels move, they appal me. 
-"Getting There" 
This poem, which seems to derive from a dream, is replete with images of 
broken or bloody or burned figures, "a hospital of dolls," "legs, arms 
piled." The repeated insistent question?"How far is it?" ?covers the more 
burning question of where she is going. To death, of course; she is clear in 
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the final lines when she speaks of stepping from "the black car of Lethe." 
But she has already admitted, "I cannot undo myself, and the train is 
steaming." The train, the conveyance, not the willing self, is what has gone 
on this journey. The self is dragged, not carried, along, "and I in agony." 
There is a great deal of exhaustion in the Ariel poems: 
And it exhausts me to watch you 
Flickering like that, wrinkly and clear red, like the skin of a mouth. 
? 
"Poppies in July" 
I am nobody; I have nothing to do with explosions. 
-"Tulips" 
I am exhausted, I am exhausted? 
Pillars of white in a blackout of knives. 
? 
"The Bee Meeting" 
Effort and impotence and exhaustion?the heavy burden of one who feels 
personal effort is meant to solve things. Much earlier, as an achingly 
ambitious college girl, Plath tried to write her way out of a serious 
depression, "gathering forces into a tight ball for the artistic leap." 
She admits in the journal entry that it is all "dreams, private dreams. But 
if I work? And always work to think, and know and practice technique 
always?" If I practice always to be perfect, especially practice technique, that 
controllable method of transformation, then won't everything come out 
right? 
Our most ancient metaphor?that life is a journey?becomes the inevitable 
figure used to express spiritual transformation. This metaphor is so 
imbedded in our understanding of spiritual life that it is hardly perceived as 
a 
metaphor. Journey, quest, pilgrimage?we use these words as a matter of 
course, unconsciously. 
Yet Sylvia Plath, who was so clearly engaged in the work of spiritual 
transformation, stumbled over this metaphor, unable to use it, unable to 
give herself the favor of understanding she was on a trip, that the 
unexpected would come her way and that this was not her responsibility, 
but her gift. 
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Because she could not see herself on a journey, except the forced passage 
of a refugee crammed into a cattle car, she also could not imagine a 
destination. "There is no terminus," she says in "Totem" (a very late 
poem), "only suitcases." No journey, just baggage. 
When there is movement (as in "Getting There"), it is usually grimly 
mechanized. "The engine is killing the track," she writes in the first line of 
this poem. The journey (the track) itself is destroyed by the pilgrim?if an 
engine can even be called a pilgrim. "I cannot run," she says in "Bee 
Meeting," "I could not run without having to run forever." Once again, no 
destination, just eternal effort. 
In place of journey with destination, Plath poses exhausted striving and 
the framed images of memory (the snapshots of autobiography), the 
horrified stills of the old life: 
My husband and child smiling out of the family photo; 
Their smiles catch onto my skin, little smiling hooks. 
-"Tulips" 
It may be that the central metaphor of the journey is potentially more 
troubling, even threatening, to a woman than to a man. After all, if it is the 
central metaphor of our culture, the quest is a male metaphor, primitively 
related to the hunt. The ancient myth for women, on the other hand, is tied 
to the icon (the virgin, the mother) and to a rooted place (the home, the 
hearth). 
But to have a history which, being a story (an autobiography), is 
wounded by plot and its fluency of action, the poet cannot remain an icon, 
a statue, a fixed body. The poet must take the trip?not just take the 
pictures. Plath hangs on to the attempt to frame the self in a picture, even 
as she is ripping herself up in a frustrated attempt at spiritual change. 
Death and resurrection. She knows someone must die. But what is 
resurrection? A complete trust in death? Or is it faith? And what is this 
"new self? A baby? There are a lot of babies in Plath's poems, "awful 
babies," weird and creepy figures of unachieved freshness. Terrible babies, 
most terrible when they are presented as statuary. Even in the first Ariel 
poem, "Morning Song," one of the more radiant poems in the collection, 
the newborn child is immediately seen as a "new statue / In a drafty 
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museum ..." There are many of these frozen baby-statues in the poems, 
one of the most chilling groupings in "Death & Co.": 
He tells me how sweet 
The babies look in their hospital 
Icebox, a simple 
Frill at the neck, 
Then the flutings of their Ionian 
Death-gowns. 
Without the saving metaphor of the journey, which does not explain 
anguish but rather gives it location and renders it potentially useful as 
metaphor, the road of the pilgrim soul is an exhausting conveyor belt, 
leading nowhere but back to a repetition of wished-for embarkations. Even 
that stylistic habit of Plath's, the triple beat of the verb or of central nouns, 
seems, in this light, not so much an insistence as an impotent stutter: 
It can talk, talk, talk. . . . 
Will you marry it, marry it, marry it. 
-"The Applicant" 
. . . These are the isolate, slow faults 
That kill, that kill, that kill. 
-"Elm" 
Now I am milkweed silk, the bees will not notice. 
They will not smell my fear, my fear, my fear. 
-"The Bee Meeting" 
If Sylvia Plath has a muse it is the moon. In "The Moon and the Yew 
Tree" she even says, "The moon is my mother." But this moon-mother "is 
not sweet like Mary." Like anything Plath is almost willing to trust, there 
is an edge, an aloof harshness to the image. 
"How I would like to believe in tenderness," she says later in the poem. 
Probably her most honest, most exhausted line. Unlike the trust expressed 
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in her early journal for "characters who commit suicide, adultery, or get 
murdered" because "what they say is True," evidence of kindness is a 
signal of weakness. 
Plath, who has taken on impossible interior burdens, doesn't believe in 
kindness, but in accomplishment: "Why am I obsessed with the idea I can 
justify myself by getting manuscripts published?" Plath's ambition, by 
which she seeks to save or find herself ("But if I work? And always work 
to think, and know and practice technique always?"), is the outer sign of a 
relentless willfulness that fills her being. 
When spiritual writers speak of the "death of the self," they mean the 
death of the will. If Sylvia Plath was loyal to her will, that instrument of 
control, it is hard to think of a writer who is more faithful to her terror, the 
radical emotion of vulnerability, than Sylvia Plath was. She retained a 
remarkable loyalty to her desperation. In no single book of poetry in the 
past quarter century has private concision voiced the interior urge for 
transformation as eloquently as Ariel does. 
And for women certainly there will always be the grave sense of history 
having been made in the Ariel poems: here, finally, the ancient struggle is 
described in female terms, the beast of living wrestled down to the mat by 
a woman, fiercely employing her?our?images in terrible, contorted holds 
until the effort failed, and the light went elsewhere. 
March 21, California, the Santa Cruz mountains washing into each other in 
hillocky mounts and slides, the spring green dotted black here and there by 
grazing cattle. Above, the pure arc of the sky, the fog of the last several days 
finally burned away. Off in the far distance, making the end of the world a 
silver glint, the Pacific is pooled. The light out there is latched by the 
horizon's delicate hinge linking sky and sea. 
No eye is as credulous of landscape as a Mid westerner's: the habit of 
flatness and soft surfaces creates a childish eagerness to believe all this 
improbable mountain-sea-sky melodrama. The dirty rusks of the neigh 
borhood snowbanks back home in St. Paul are there behind me somewhere, 
but I've been here a week now, and carry a wildflower book on walks, 
diligently labeling the facts of spring: Scotch broom, trillium, meadow 
foam. . . . 
I cannot imagine killing myself. Like everyone, I've sometimes wished I 
were dead, but have never inflicted a wound: a habit of being interested in 
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the next thing saves us non-suicides, I suppose, at dangerous moments. Last 
week the filthy snowbanks of St. Paul, this week the sea: good things 
sometimes turn up. That is enough for some of us. I found myself saying, 
as I took a hike in this glory of a landscape yesterday, "Great God, great 
God." Not simply an exclamation. It was a prayer, and rose of its own 
volition. Maybe the only real prayers are exclamations, brief, unbidden, 
hardly belonging to the speaker. 
Then at night, almost finished with this, typing at the furious pace I 
learned years ago when I worked as a temp for Kelly Girl, I was halted 
abruptly by a power failure. The typewriter stopped like a stone. The study 
lamp went dark, returned with a brief wheeze of sepia light, and then closed 
down entirely. Everything went black, and stayed black. 
This morning we found out what had happened. A man, crazy and 
jealous, shot his girlfriend from his car while she was driving along one of 
these narrow mountain roads in her car. She crashed into a power 
pole?dead. Then the man went streaking off in his car, sheered off a 
ridge?dead too, probably a suicide, though it's hard to say for sure. 
The bizarre sensation of connection, person to person: tapping away here 
at top speed, my current cut off by a woman's death, the knowledge now 
that my inconvenience was her end. That casual link, the faint flicker of odd 
light from the study lamp before everything went pure black. The weight 
of chance in a life, the relative destinies we bear and occasionally touch 
across the great, vibrating vacancy. 
Now the power is back, the typewriter is humming, and out the window 
the colossal miracle of this landscape slants to the endless sea. 
I said I wished to trust poetry. I wished also, like many women of my 
generation, to trust ambition, the power of personal accomplishment, 
rather than the old roles of dependence and service. And, reading Plath 
again, I have even wished for her sake that it might have been so?that she 
could have felt justified by getting manuscripts published, by working hard 
and practicing technique always. 
But it's way past time to quit wishing. Or to mistake wishing with 
prayer. "Writing is prayer," Kafka, that most afflicted one, said. And 
writing, certainly, isn't wishing; it is witnessing. But to what do you 
testify? To your own desperation? Plath did that. To your desires? But isn't 
that back to wishes again? 
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There is a way, and Sylvia Plath knew it as a girl writing out of the genius 
of her loneliness at Swampscott, facing the other ocean, locating herself by 
its immensity: 
A consuming love . . . of the clean unbroken sense that the rocks which 
are nameless, the waves which are nameless, the ragged grass which is 
nameless, are all defined momentarily through the consciousness of the 
being who observes them. 
This is the transforming self, the useful being who "with the sun burning 
into rock, and flesh, and wind ruffling grass and hair" experiences "an 
awareness that the blind immense unconscious impersonal and neutral 
forces will endure." She recognizes herself as "the fragile, miraculously knit 
organism which interprets" all of this and "endows [it] with meaning." 
That miraculously knit organism which interprets was, in Sylvia Plath's 
case, too relentless to safeguard that very fragility. 
But on the washed rocks of Swampscott she expressed with serenity her 
function, which was to "move about for a little, then falter, fail, and 
decompose at last into the anonymous soil, voiceless, faceless, without 
identity." A statement that is sister to Simone Weil's understanding that "It 
is our function in this world to consent to the existence of the universe." 
Whether the peace of that acquiescence, that anonymity, was Sylvia 
Plath's on this earth is unknown to us. Still, she imagined it once, which is 
to say she lived it once. That counts. 
And if wishes refuse to be denied voice, it should be possible to advance 
a small wish on her behalf, something merely ceremonial, but in the spirit 
of valediction: that something might end with what she intended as her final 
word in the book she understood was her claim to genius, the book which 
would place her among the poets after her death. 
For in the distance, the sun is cutting the Pacific clean silver, and it is the 
first day of spring. 
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